CJEU, Grand Chamber, Judgement 2 February 2021, C-489/19, D.B. v. CONSOB
Technological evolution has opened the way for new paradigms in criminal law. A change in the traditional operating procedures has impacted finance as well, with significant consequences for market abuse. In particular, the difficulty in distinguishing human action from computer programs' is aggravated by the use of the so-called high-frequency trading (HFT), characterized by the speed of acquisition and processing of information and by "decision-making" autonomy with respect to any instructions given by natural persons. The purpose of this study is therefore to verify, in light of the European legislation as well, the adaptation of the types of offence provided by law in the field of market abuse due to technological innovation, and to assess the compatibility of the trading system through HFT with the inalienable principle of personality of criminal responsibility.
The reform of the Italian provisions on market abuse, implementing the Regulation (EU) 596/2014, concerns a controversial legal issue, debated not only by scholars but also in the case law, including the European Courts (CJEU and ECtHR). Legislative decree no. 107/2018 provides for rules that are often inconsistent in themselves, without solving at all many problems in the area of market abuse
The separation of powers involves also the issue of external integration of criminal provisions. With respect to the classical relationship between the legislative and the executive branch, where the former requires the latter to shape some technical profiles of a given criminal provision, a significant role is nowadays played by authorities, EU institutions and soft law instruments, even in the lack of a proper referral by the criminal provision itself. The said phenomenon can be clearly seen in market abuse cases. and legal-corporate framework
Legislative Decree no. 107/2018 was enacted to comply with the 596/2014 EU market abuse regulation. While the 2014/57/EU directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse has not been implemented yet, several changes affect the pre-existing criminal provisions in this area. The new legislation in place is however quite controversial about its criminal law ramifications
This article compares the Italian and the English and Welsh systems of sanctions adopted for the suppression of insider dealing’s offences. In light of the decision in Grande Stevens and Others v. Italy, this article particularly focusses on the court’s compliance with the fundamental human right to the substantial ne bis in idem and on the powers that Parliaments entrusted to their national Security Exchange Commissions. Finally, by underlining pros and cons of the two legal systems, this article suggests some practical solutions to overcome the existing problems of double jeopardy and excess of powers.
A recent judgment by the Trani criminal court has dealt for the first time with a possible criminal liability of Standard & Poor’s for the offence of market manipulation in respect of its rating activity. This paper analyses the judgment, with a particular focus on the question whether and to what extent rating can alter the investors’ decisions, and therefore the price of financial instruments.
Current Italian regulations on insider trading and market manipulation, with their ‘dual-track’ system of parallel criminal and administrative sanctions, have been ruled incompatible with the individual right to ne bis in idem by the Strasbourg Court in Grande Stevens vs. Italy. The judgment calls upon Italian courts and legislators to harmonise our laws with the conventional obligations on ne bis in idem, which stem both from Article 4 of Protocol 7 ECHR and from Article 50 of the European Charter, the latter provision enjoying the status of EU primary law and having as such direct effect in the domestic legal system. This article explores some possible ways, de lege lata and ferenda, to achieve that goal.
Il Regolamento (UE) 596/2014 e la Direttiva 2014/57/UE intervengono incisivamente sul comparto degli abusi di mercato, attraverso scelte politico-criminali nette che risentono delle elaborazioni sovranazionali sulla “materia penale” e disegnano un sistema sanzionatorio unitario rispettoso del principio del ne bis in idem. Direttiva e Regolamento sono dunque destinati a conformare il diritto punitivo interno sia per quanto concerne la fattispecie di abuso di informazioni privilegiate, sia con riguardo all’ipotesi di manipolazione del mercato. Il legislatore nazionale sarà dunque chiamato a un non facile compito di adeguamento del vigente assetto del market abuse al fine di ottemperare alle prescrizioni eurounitarie.