The aim of the present work is to question the hypothetical margins of criminal relevance of assistance behaviors provided by the rescue operators at sea (especially if belonging to N.G.O.s) in favor of the migrants intercepted in the Mediterranean Sea and transferred to the Italian shores. This analysis, which will necessarily presuppose the recognition of the numerous national and international obligations in term of search and rescue at sea, will move from the examination of the relations between the ordinary and lawful rescue operations and the crime of facilitating illegal immigration; then it will consider the possibility − presented by recent judicial cases, starting from the criminal proceedings that saw the seizure of the Iuventa ship, belonging to the N.G.O. Jugend Rettet − that some conducts carried out by the rescuers, further and different from those strictly related to the rescue activities, may be concretely considered suitable to support their responsibility under Article 12 of Italian t.u. imm.
Human traffickers frequently take advantage of operative protocols, that make them unpunishable pursuant the Italian Criminal Law, because, according to Art. 6 of the Italian Penal Code and International Convention on the High Sea, jurisdictional powers cannot be exercised when the conduct is committed on the High Sea. So, illustrating the territorial limitations of the efficacy of Criminal Law, the research focuses on the hermeneutical solution given by the Court of Cassation that, apparently with the intent of pursuing a more effectivity of the Criminal response, recurred to the controversial category of the indirect offender in order to sanction smuggling conducts that enjoy the rescue intervention of the Italian authorities to reach their criminal aims. In turn, in order to better identify the Italian jurisdiction in the crime of Art. 12 T.U. imm. I propose to correctly apply the concorso di persone (art. 110 c.p.) and the reato eventualmente permanente. The difficulties of a dogmatic framing, together with the trend towards a universalistic validity of the jurisdictional powers when human rights are involved, may recommend an interpretation of Art. 7 of the Italian Penal Code to cover a wider protection of human rights, according to interpretive solutions of § 6 of the German Penal Code.
This article focuses on a topic which is rarely studied but which merits being explored: the withdrawal of charges after the prosecution in the proceedings in front of the International Criminal Court. This contribution sets out to examine the typical features of the withdrawal of charges through analysing the regulatory actions and Court-created case law, examining the conditions and effects, which arise during international criminal law proceedings.
For many years, in the context of international criminal law, the rights of the defence have taken a back seat to the need of prosecuting and punishing the alleged perpetrators of international crimes. In such a scenario the Rome Statute, through which the International Criminal Court was established, represents the highest normative evolution in guarantee of the fundamental rights of those being investigated and prosecuted before the Court. The purpose of the present article is to evaluate whether or not, and how, the rights of the defence are safeguarded, not only “on paper”, but also in the concrete application of the Statute, with particular reference to the confirmation of charges stage of the proceedings.
Questo articolo esamina la legittimità della giurisdizione penale indiana nei confronti dei due fucilieri di marina italiani coinvolti nell’incidente della petroliera Enrica Lexie. Lo scritto, attraverso una trattazione sistematica dei rilevanti principi del diritto internazionale, sostiene la tesi per cui il diritto alla cognizione del caso spetta in maniera concorrente tanto all’Italia quanto all’India, ma evidenzia alcune anomalie argomentative impiegate dall’India per sostenere la competenza giurisdizionale delle proprie corti. L’articolo inoltre dimostra che la giurisdizione indiana, per quanto astrattamente sussistente, sia nel concreto impedita nel suo esercizio in ragione della natura della condotta posta in essere dai due militari, sottratta alla cognizione degli Stati stranieri in quanto commessa nell’esercizio delle funzioni attribuite ai fucilieri dall’Italia. Nel trattare le questioni connesse alla giurisdizione e all’immunità, l’articolo non manca di affrontare gli argomenti più problematici della vicenda, quali il tentativo indiano di “territorializzazione” della Zona Economica Esclusiva, il principio male captus bene detentus, il riconoscimento dell’immunità ratione materiae per gli atti ultra vires e il rapporto fra l’immunità funzionale e gli Status of Forces Agreements.