This article draws on the recent Court of Cassation decision No. 890 dated 12 January 2016, in which the Court held the criminal relevance of false valuations unaltered, even following the developments introduced by Law No. 69/2015, to the cases envisaged by Article 2621 of the Italian Civil Code. The Court, evaluating the issue on more than one interpretive level, overturned the solution adopted in its first intervention on the subject. This article, after examining the most significant passages of the decision on the issue, directs its focus on a secondary analysis, considering the possible consequences of the interpretations made by the Court on the subjects of "materiality" and "relevance" and the criteria for identifying false valuations.
This article analyses the concept, current developments and paradigmatic examples of criminal law case law, in relation to topics such as case law as a source of law, the doctrine of precedent, and the implications of the nullum crimen in the continental legal systems. The research investigates the category of unlawful interpretation through the violation of the principle of non-retroactive application of unpredictable, but legitimate, case law . A special attention is devoted to those cases that are not covered by such principle (realisation and individualization of the law, or otherwise a hidden analogy) and on those cases that are subjected to it according to the different influence of the discipline of mistake of law and to the nomophylactic role of the United Divisions of the Italian Court of Cassation and to the supreme courts in general. In conclusion, the article presents an updated reconstruction of the relationship between predictability of case law and judicial syllogism.
It has been clear for a long time that in the field of criminal law the decline of the "law in the books" coincides with a growing appreciation for the “law in action". However, if it is true that this process comes with, and indeed is supported by, several institutionally committed "betrayals" to the detriment of the more traditional structure of criminal law, it is also undeniable that this "change of era" for the classical axioms of criminal law seems to increase the importance of the familiar question of the relationship between the Legislative and the Judiciary. In this context, it is imperative to devise a way to consolidate the - new - guarantees offered by the “legality in action" is compelling, while striking at same time a fair balance between the "law in the books" and the “law in action” .
Offenses of negligence have always been characterized by a certain degree of incompleteness. They act like open models needing to be constantly integrated by statutory or socially-based rules (rules with precautionary objectives that impose a particular behaviour in order to prevent the occurrence of harmful events). This feature creates a number of issues, involving either the consistency of this tendency with the principle of legality, or the proper space to give to these behavioural canons in the whole geography of criminal negligence. In fact, the change over time of precautionary rules can be relevant under the art. 2 c.p. and they could be said to fully be part of the offense also when – existing in subordinated sources of law – they do not merely add an element of technical specification to it. These topics are analysed here in the specific context of the microsystem of musical, cinematic and theatrical performances defined by the so-called recent “Decreto palchi”.
The subject of the relationship between criminal law and criminal procedure, if examined under the perspective of the law-making process, calls for a reflection on the possibility to conciliate the “judge-made law” with the principle of legality, as it is enshrined in the Italian Constitution and as it is intended by the European Court of Human Rights. The author is skeptical about the possibility for the judge-made law, in the Italian system, to comply with the substantive meaning of the principle of legality as a guarantee for the individual. Indeed, for legality to act as a guarantee, not only the law must be clear and precise in order to constitute a reason for action and allow the individual to foresee the consequences of his action. But also, the individual must be judged according to the same rule that is supposed to lead his action. In other words, the “rule of judgment” ought not to be “created” in the proceeding where the responsibility of the individual is established. Otherwise, the requirement of foreseeability (and non-retroactivity) of the law would be infringed. As well as the cognitive nature of the criminal proceeding. In response to the intrinsic unpredictability of a judge-made law in the Italian system, and to the difficulty to find remedies for it, it still seems necessary to require the respect of the principle of legality as it is enshrined in Article 25 of the Italian Constitution. This means that it is for the legislator to intervene when the law does not define clearly and precisely the elements of the offence and Leaves too much discretion to the judge in the definition of the “rule of judgment”. As it has been revealed by the ECtHR case Contrada v. Italy with regard to the offence of concorso esterno in associazione mafiosa.
This article is based on an academic, as well as statistical, analysis of all the Italian Supreme Court's 2015 sentences concerning the offence of rape (art. 609-bis c.p.) in which the previous convictions have been confirmed (after the rejection of the defendants' appeals). However, the research is mainly focused on the 110 decisions (out of a total of 340) in which both the exact penalty inflicted and the details of the criminal conduct concretely committed are clearly reported. The 'traditional' investigation on the Court's interpretation of the elements of the offence has shown no particular innovations as far as the central notions of “sexual act” and “coercive violence” are concerned. Some developments, instead, have been observed in the concept of “psychological inferiority”, which has been expanded again, disconnecting it from the rigid medical-psychiatric parameters (with the real risk of infringing the principle of legality): this is of course to provide vulnerable subjects with a stronger protection. The most relevant results of the analysis have undoubtedly been those related to the exercise of judicial discretion with regards to sentencing. As far as sentencing is concerned, the Italian Supreme Court has very limited power, since the power of deciding the actual duration of convicts' penalties lies with the Tribunals and Appellate Courts' hands. The investigation has shown endemic discrepancies concerning penalties inflicted for similar conducts by different courts, as well as too lenient penalties, especially in cases of rape and paedophilia. In conclusion, there is a clear violation of a principle - yet to be expounded upon by scholars - that we could denominate “sentencing legality”.
Il contributo discute della rilevanza di alcune situazioni-limite che si verificano nella realtà pratica dell’esecuzione penitenziaria (in particolare, in tema di incompatibilità carceraria, di rapporti genitoriali, di aiuto ai fini del definitivo reinserimento nella realtà sociale), come spia di deficit fondamentali dell’attuale regime di ordinamento penitenziario e dello stesso concetto di ‘trattamento’ che ne sta alla base. Si denuncia in proposito la mancanza di saperi nomologici in materia di ‘trattamento’ ed il sostanziale disinteresse per questa lacuna, che finisce con il rimettere alla discrezionalità dell’amministrazione in senso lato (comprensiva dell’area trattamentale) l’intera fase esecutiva. Infine, auspicando almeno la perdita di centralità dell’esecuzione carceraria, si segnala un diverso ruolo che dovrebbe competere alla legalità dell’esecuzione (ed ai saperi giuridici): se, rispetto ad un carcere inteso come residuale, ciò che diviene centrale è definire le condizioni della legalità, si tratterà di studiare in che cosa può essere tutelata e valorizzata la persona in un’istituzione di questo tipo; ma certamente non potranno essere i giuristi a farlo. Il loro compito sarà quello di esplicitare tutte le condizioni di tutela normativa della persona a chi possa studiare, alle condizioni normative date, cosa può essere scientificamente plausibile in termini di promozione dell’individuo.
Il contributo prende le mosse da una recente pronuncia della Cassazione che, per risolvere una questione di successione di norme penali nel tempo, ha fissato il tempus commissi delicti di un omicidio colposo in corrispondenza della verificazione dell’evento letale, ed ha perciò applicato una pena più severa di quella vigente al momento – assai più risalente – in cui l’imputato aveva posto in essere la condotta causalmente rilevante. L’Autore critica la soluzione abbracciata dalla Suprema Corte alla luce del principio costituzionale di irretroattività in malam partem, nonché dell’omologo principio sancito dall’art. 7 della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo. A quest’ultimo proposito, viene prospettata la possibilità di presentare un ricorso alla Corte di Strasburgo, finalizzato ad ottenere l’accertamento della violazione e la successiva rideterminazione della pena in executivis.
Muovendo da alcune recenti pronunce delle Corti interna ed europea, l’Autrice evidenzia la problematicità del concetto di “prevedibilità dell’esito giudiziario” e della tendenza ad attribuire efficacia vincolante ai precedenti dei giudici europei. Sottolinea, per contro, l’esigenza di un approccio di tipo ermeneutico, volto ad esplicitare i presupposti assiologici e le conseguenze delle differenti opzioni interpretative.
Prendendo spunto da una recente sentenza della Corte di cassazione (Sez. II, 21 aprile 2015 n. 34147, Perego), che censura la sentenza della Corte EDU nel caso Contrada, l’Autrice disegna un possibile percorso di sviluppo dialogico e corale del diritto, risultante anche dall’incontro tra giudici nazionali e giudici sovranazionali.